One
In 1991, Somalia’s Siad Barre regime was overthrown, and the country descended into a state of fragmentation ruled by multiple warlords operating simultaneously.
In the years that followed, a combination of war, natural disaster, and the collapse of the social and economic order produced a devastating famine in Somalia, leaving vast numbers of dead. But when United Nations relief supplies arrived in Somalia, a farcical scene unfolded: warlords seized the aid, fired on refugees and volunteers, and humanitarian workers were forced to withdraw from the country.
The United Nations subsequently passed a resolution to use armed force to maintain order in Somalia and enforce a humanitarian aid effort — to impose peace by force.
In late 1992, UN forces entered Somalia, with American troops forming the core of the contingent.
In June 1993, the US military posted a bounty for the capture of Somali warlord Aidid. In October, US forces clashed with Aidid’s armed faction, resulting in the direct deaths of 18 American soldiers and the loss of 3 armed helicopters and a number of military vehicles. (This event was later depicted in the American film Black Hawk Down.)
The Black Hawk incident was the most painful defeat the US military had suffered since the Vietnam War. That same month, American television screens repeatedly showed footage of Somalis dragging the body of a US Special Operations soldier through the streets at the end of a rope. American public opinion erupted, demanding to know “why we are fighting other people’s wars.” Ultimately, under mounting pressure, the United States decided to withdraw from Somalia.
Many historians believe that during the Rwandan Genocide that followed, the Hutu strategy of killing Belgian peacekeepers in order to force Belgium’s withdrawal was directly modeled on this incident.
Two
A country’s political situation is deeply intertwined with the lives of its fishermen.
Somalia has a very long coastline and abundant fish stocks. Fishermen’s lives could not be called lavish, but they were sufficient for self-sufficiency. After 1991, Somalia’s political landscape fell into prolonged chaos, and this created an opportunity for European and American fishing vessels equipped for deep-sea fishing. They ventured freely into Somali waters to fish, operating with mechanized efficiency and adopting an approach of total extraction without restraint.
Out of concern for ecological sustainability and other considerations, Europe and America impose strict regulations on fishing in their own waters. For example, fish that have not yet reached a specified size cannot be caught or sold. But in Somalia, where the fishing belonged to someone else and cost nothing, they swept in everything regardless of size.
Under these conditions, Somali fishermen — already operating with comparatively primitive equipment — found their livelihoods severely squeezed. They were regularly driven away by European and American fishing vessels. Fishing in their own waters had become a difficult thing to do.
One Somali pirate interviewed said: “We live by fishing. Besides fishing, there is nothing else for us. But now, we can’t even go out to sea. They don’t want us to fish. Either we die, or we fight. They arrest us, they burn our boats, they call us pirates — are they not the pirates?
“They plunder our resources, so we seize their boats…”
And the subsequent nuclear waste dumping scandal only deepened these internal and external contradictions.
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami sent enormous waves crashing along the Somali coastline. Those waves churned up tons of nuclear waste and toxic garbage, exposing it to the world.
This nuclear waste and garbage included radioactive material and toxic refuse that could cause cancer and genetic mutation. Investigations revealed that most of it had come from Europe.
An environmental organization exposed the arrangement: European waste disposal companies had signed agreements with the Somali government, paying the government eight US dollars for every ton of toxic waste dumped along Somalia’s coast. In Europe, the cost of storing and processing one ton of toxic waste was one thousand dollars.
A survey conducted by local Somali media among coastal residents found that 70 percent of respondents supported the piracy, viewing it as a form of “self-defense” — and a way of “striking back.”
Three
On November 15, 2008, Somali pirates seized the Saudi oil tanker Sirius Star on the open ocean roughly 450 miles off the East African coast.
At the time, the Sirius Star was the second-largest oil tanker in the world — 330 meters in length, 318,000 tons of displacement, with its cargo and vessel together valued at as much as 200 million US dollars. Also taken hostage were the 25 crew members aboard.
This was the first time Somali pirates had seized a vessel of such enormous size, and the incident occurred far outside the patrol range of European and American naval ships.
The shipping company operating the Sirius Star issued a statement announcing the formation of a crisis team to seek the pirates’ release of the crew and the return of the tanker. Insurance companies noted that for a vessel of that scale, even after negotiation, the shipping company might ultimately need to pay a ransom of no less than five million US dollars.
Reports indicate that the Somali pirates initially demanded a ransom of 25 million US dollars. On November 19th, the pirates reduced their demand to 10 million US dollars.
In early December, the Sirius Star was ultimately released. A negotiating representative disclosed that the final ransom paid was three million US dollars.
However, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Kenya denied that any ransom had been paid to the Somali pirates, stating that the Sirius Star‘s release was the result of various diplomatic efforts.
The entire airdrop of the ransom, however, was photographed in full by the American Navy, which had been monitoring the pirates throughout.
Many have questioned why ships passing through these waters are not simply equipped with security personnel or weapons.
The reason is that cargo ships are civilian trade and transport platforms operating between nations. Many countries prohibit cargo ships from carrying weapons — otherwise, weapons smuggling and related criminal activity would readily exploit this as cover. And in countries where weapons are permitted on board, the weapons must be thrown into the sea before the ship enters port. Furthermore, the waters where Somali pirates are most active happen to be one of the busiest sea lanes in the world, with more than ten thousand vessels passing through each year — of which only a handful, or at most several dozen in a year, are successfully seized. Equipping every cargo ship with an armed security detail would be enormously expensive — a cost too great for most shipping companies to absorb.
Four
In January 2013, one of Somalia’s most notorious pirates — Mohamed Abdi Hassan, known by the nickname “Afweyne” or “Big Mouth,” the same warlord who had led the hijacking of the Saudi oil tanker Sirius Star in 2008 — held a press conference in the Somali capital, Mogadishu.
At the press conference, Abdi Hassan announced:
His retirement.
He described piracy as “a dirty trade,” stated that he had already discussed the matter of this dirty business with the previous government, and expressed hope that the new government would “root it out.”
He also said he would be very happy to encourage his former associates to abandon piracy and surrender their weapons and equipment.
The Somali government clearly welcomed and accepted Hassan’s retirement, not only publicly announcing “no charges would be pursued” but also granting him diplomatic status and a passport.
Note: The above account draws on related news reporting and documentary materials, including Hungry Pirates of Somalia and The Truth About Somalia.